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Question 
How have governments in Latin America and Eastern Europe responded to popular protest 
movements, and what support have international actors offered?  What were the outcomes of the 
governments' responses? 
This report is one of a pair of research reports looking at how governments respond to protest 
movements. This report reviews broad trends internationally, drawing on illustrative examples 
from Latin America and Eastern Europe; the second report examines protests movements in the 
Middle East and North Africa in more depth. 
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The dynamics of protest movements can vary greatly, and especially since the mid-2000s they 
tend to be driven by specific local economic or political grievances rather than by broad global 
issues (Carothers & Youngs, 2015). Government responses to protests are also highly diverse, 
covering ‘a wide spectrum from complete tolerance to the harshest possible repression’, 
(Carothers & Youngs, 2015, p. 23).  
In general, the most common government responses to protests are to tolerate them without 
directly engaging with the protesters, or to repress the protests through either violent or non-
violent means.  Governments accommodate protesters’ demands in a minority of cases, ranging 
between 8% and about 25% of protests according to studies looking at various types of protests, 
geographic scopes, and time periods (Brancati, 2016; Clark & Regan, 2018; Franklin, 2009). 
The responses that governments do make to protests are influenced by many factors. In general, 
as protests cause increasing levels of disruption to the economy and society, the probability of a 
government accommodating protesters’ demands and making concessions increases. However, 
as the political cost of making concessions increases (for example, when demands are farther-
reaching or more directly affect those in power), the probability of making concessions decreases 
and the probability of repressing protests, either violently or non-violently, increases (Klein & 
Regan, 2018). Protests are more likely to win concessions if they are larger, seek limited 
demands, cause significant disruption, take place in more democratic countries, maintain long-
term pressure, and use non-violent tactics (Brancati, 2016; Carothers & Youngs, 2015; Franklin, 
2009). Protests are less likely to meet with repression if they are larger and seek limited 
demands, if they take place in countries that are more democratic and have a better human 
rights record, if their country has higher foreign capital dependency and is party to preferential 
trade agreements with hard stanadrds for human rights protection, and if they use non-violent 
tactics (Brancati, 2016; Franklin, 2008, 2009; Hafner-Burton, 2005). 
International actors tend not to directly and actively respond to protests in other countries. In 
cases where protests are repressed violently, international actors denounce excessive use of 
force, but such statements do not appear to have much effect and there is even some evidence 
that governments receiving criticism are incentivised to increase repression further to cover up 
abuses (DeMeritt, Conrad, & Fariss, 2016). Economic ties have a moderating effect on a 
government’s response to protests, increasing the likelihood of concessions and decreasing the 
likelihood of repression.  Governments are more receptive to criticism from international partners 
where there are strong economic links and higher foreign capital dependency, and trade 
agreements containing hard standards on human rights incentivise protection for human rights 
more strongly than subscribing to more general human rights agreements does (Brancati, 2016; 
DeMeritt et al., 2016; Franklin, 2008, 2009).  
Most protests do not achieve their desired outcomes; they either generate no response or they 
are repressed, either violently or non-violently. Many protests, however, do achieve results which 
can include high officials resigning, legislation being repealed and initiatives halted or changed, 
constitutional reform, or other changes to political, economic, or social policy. The protests most 
likely to achieve results are those with political, legal or social aims, rather than those aimed at 
economic reform (Ortiz, Burke, Berrada, & Saenz, 2013). It is rare for governments or high 
officials to be removed from power, and such drastic outcomes are more likely when protests 
have been violent (Brancati, 2016), but there are also many examples of officials being removed 
after peaceful protests.  
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It is difficult for protest movements to sustain sufficient momentum to achieve deep institutional 
reform. Some observers even argue that protest movements can ‘tear down old structures but 
not foster sustained political institution building or effective participation in formal political 
processes’ (Carothers & Youngs, 2015, p. 18). There are multiple examples (such as Ukraine in 
2013-14, Guatemala in 2015, and Romania in 2012-2018) where protests led to governments 
reversing plans and even to the removal of high officials, but where the political establishment 
resisted deeper institutional reforms and patterns of behaviour persisted even though the 
individuals holding office changed.  
2. Types of responses to protests 
Government responses to protests are highly diverse, covering ‘a wide spectrum from complete 
tolerance to the harshest possible repression’, but with a high frequency of violence and a 
common pattern of ‘blaming foreign actors for protests and reducing space for domestic civil 
society actors to operate and seek support from abroad’ (Carothers & Youngs, 2015, p. 23). 
Comparing protests and responses over time, across countries, and across different research 
studies is difficult because there is no common standard for precisely what kind of activities 
should be counted and how they should be classified. For example, by one measure, in China in 
the year 2010 alone there were 180,000 protest events – mostly small-scale protests about local 
issues (Carothers & Youngs, 2015, p. 5). Governments also often respond in more than one way 
to a protest event or series of events – for example, they may attempt to repress protests initially, 
and then later make concessions (Brancati, 2016, pp. 107–126).  
Governments’ responses to protest movements are often described as following one of four 
general patterns (Brancati, 2016, pp. 107–126): 
 Non-response or toleration of protests, in which governments allow protests to proceed 
but do not engage with them in any significant way. 
 Accommodation or concession to protesters’ demands, which could range from 
tokenistic offers such as agreeing to discuss issues without making specific reform 
commitments, or making political, economic, or other policy concessions that respond to 
protesters’ demands in whole or in part. 
 Non-violent repression through measures such as restricting demonstrations, 
controlling print and broadcast media, restricting communications media such as cell 
phones and the internet, and organising counter-protests. 
 Violent repression, through deploying police, paramilitary, or military forces to use 
varying degrees of force against protesters, such as hand-to-hand weapons, tear gas, 
water cannons, or firearms using conventional or non-lethal ammunition. 
The Mass Mobilization Project at Binghamton University monitors protest events worldwide and 
provides data that currently cover 15,570 events across 162 countries from 1990 to 2018. The 
dataset identifies 17,410 responses to protest events, as some events receiving more than one 
response. The most common response is no response, or toleration, making up 44% of 
instances (Figure 1) (Clark & Regan, 2018). 
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Figure 1: Government responses to protests, global, 1990-2018 
 
Source: Author’s own, data taken from Clark & Regan, 2018, https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/HTTWYL  
A study of government responses to protests1 focusing on Latin America, covering 832 cases in 
seven countries between 1981 and 1995, found similar a pattern, although with somewhat higher 
rates of accommodation/concession and lower rates of repression (Figure 2).  
Figure 2: Government responses to contentious challenges, Latin America, 1981-1995 
 
Source: Author’s own, data take from Franklin, 2009, p. 703, https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/pdf/10.1177/1065912908322405  
There is some indication that pro-democracy protests2 may provoke stronger repressive 
responses from governments. These protests, since they directly challenge politicians and the 
governing regime, may pose a more direct existential threat to politicians and regimes than 
protests about social or economic issues. A study looking at these types of protests from 1989 to 
2011 finds that violent repression was the most common response of governments, used in two-
                                                   
1 The study defined its scope as ‘contentious political challenges’, defined as ‘collective, unconventional acts 
taken by inhabitants of a country directed against or expressing opposition to their government, its policies or 
personnel, or the political regime itself… outside of the officially accepted, institutionalized methods of conflict 
resolution’ (Franklin, 2009, p. 701). 
2 Mass public demonstrations in which participants demand that a country adopts or upholds democratic 




















thirds of cases. Even in cases where concessions were made, two-thirds of the time concessions 
were only made after first trying to repress the protests through either violent or non-violent 
means (figures not included here due to copyright restrictions) (Brancati, 2016, p. 107).  
3. Factors influencing government responses to protests 
One approach to analysing responses to protests is to consider the likelihood of different 
responses as being dependent on the costs of disruption caused by the protests, in the form of 
economic losses and public disorder, and the political costs of concession to protesters’ 
demands. Klein & Regan (2018), using global data on protests from 1990-2014, find that where 
disruption costs are high, such as when protests interfere with trade and commerce or greatly 
affect daily activities of the population, governments are less likely to tolerate protests and more 
likely to accommodate protesters’ demands, all else being equal. Where the cost of granting 
concessions is high, such as when protesters demand extensive changes that directly affect 
political leaders or pose an existential threat to the regime, or where they use violence, which 
increases the likelihood of future violence and undermines the state’s ability to maintain order, 
governments are less likely to tolerate or accommodate protesters’ demands, and more likely to 
respond with repression (either violent or non-violent) (figures not included here due to copyright 
restrictions). 
The table below summarises characteristics of protest events that have been found to have a 
statistically significant effect on the likelihood of governments responding with accommodation or 
repression. The studies summarised here cover varying geographical scopes, types of protests, 
and time periods, and present their results in different ways, so the information available is not 
necessarily comparable across all characteristics. Further discussion of some of these 
characteristics follows the table.  
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Likelihood of accommodation / concessions Likelihood of repression Scope and source of 
study (see notes below 
table for further details) 
Size of protests Larger protests are more likely to win concessions  Global (Carothers & 
Youngs, 2015, p. 5) 
Larger protests (in terms of the number of 
participants or the number of participants per 
capita) are more likely to win concessions 
 Democracy protests, global 
(Brancati, 2016, pp. 128–
132) 
Larger protests more likely to win concessions, but 
the effect is small (2.5% increase in probability of 
concession for the largest protests compared with 
the smallest) 
The largest protests were 37% less likely to be 
repressed than the smallest ones, and 34% 
percent more likely to be tolerated  
Latin America (Franklin, 
2009, p. 710) 
Limited, specific 
demands 
6.5% more likely to win concessions  10.9% less likely to be repressed Latin America (Franklin, 
2009, pp. 708-709) 
Presence of elite 
supporters 
8.2% more likely to win concessions 3.5% less likely to be repressed Latin America (Franklin, 
2009, p. 711) 
Economic crisis 
underway 
There is an indirect positive association, as 
economic crises are associated with larger protests, 
which are in turn associated with a higher likelihood 
of concessions 
 Democracy protests, global 
(Brancati, 2016, p. 143) 
Economic 
inequality 
No significant effect  Democracy protests, global 
(Brancati, 2016, p. 143) 
Economic 
development 
(higher GDP per 
capita) 
Higher GDP per capita is less likely to be 
associated with democratic reforms or transitions 
 
 Democracy protests, global 






Likelihood of accommodation / concessions Likelihood of repression Scope and source of 
study (see notes below 
table for further details) 
Agricultural 
employment 
The greater the percentage of people employed in 
agriculture, the higher the likelihood of democracy 
protests to be associated with democratic 
transitions 
 Democracy protests, global 
(Brancati, 2016, p. 173) 
Foreign capital 
dependency 
Positive but weak association. However, in 
countries with a poor human rights record, high 
foreign capital dependency increases the probability 
of concessions by 60.2% 
Positive but weak association. However, in 
countries with a poor human rights record, high 
foreign capital dependency decreases the 
probability of repression by 29.8% 
Latin America (Franklin, 
2009, pp. 711) 
Previous human 
rights violations in 
country 
 Countries that have been criticised on human 
rights are 27.3% more likely to use repression 
Latin America (Franklin, 




 No significant effect Latin America (Franklin, 
2008, p. 189) 
Subscribing to 
trade agreements 
with human rights 
provisions 
 Trade agreements with ‘hard’ standards for 
human rights protection reduce the probability 
of repression from one year to the next by up 





 Increased likelihood of repression (see 
discussion below) 
Global (DeMeritt et al., 





Likelihood of accommodation / concessions Likelihood of repression Scope and source of 
study (see notes below 




 Increased likelihood of future repression (but 
see discussion below) 
 
Where a country has strong economic ties 
internationally, criticism on human rights can 
make the government up to 33% less likely to 
use repression against future protests, but this 
effect is short-lived (see discussion below) 
Latin America (Franklin, 
2008, p. 187) 
Democracy status 
in the country 
Countries with the highest democracy scores are 
6.0% more likely to grant concessions 
Countries with the highest democracy scores 
are 29.1% less likely to use repression 
Latin America (Franklin, 
2009, pp. 711) 
 Democracy does not significantly lessen 
repression, controlling for other factors 
Latin America (Franklin, 
2008, p. 205) 
 Presidents with broader popular support utilise 
significantly lower magnitudes of repression, 
while presidents who were never popularly 
elected or who have lost popular support tend 
to be more repressive 
Latin America (Franklin, 
2008, p. 205) 
Democracy (as indicated by a higher score on the 
polity index) is significantly related to a lower 
likelihood of democratic transitions and reforms 
(possibly because countries that are already 
democratic are unlikely to make further transitions) 
 Democracy protests, global 




Reduced likelihood of concessions  Democracy protests, global 
(Brancati, 2016, p. 174-175) 
 Increased likelihood of further repression Latin America (Franklin, 





Likelihood of accommodation / concessions Likelihood of repression Scope and source of 
study (see notes below 
table for further details) 
Long-duration 
protests 
The probability of concessions increases by 23.2% 
for the longest protests (120 days) compared with 
the shortest ones (1 day), but the size of the effect 
increases slowly and with great variation. 
Increased probability of combined concession 
and repression by 45.5% for the longest 
protests 
Latin America (Franklin, 
2009, pp. 710-711) 
Location of protests 
(urban or rural 
areas) 
No significant effect  Democracy protests, global 
(Brancati, 2016, p. 143) 
Violent protest 
tactics 
Increased likelihood of removing chief executives, 
but not other reforms 
 Democracy protests, global 
(Brancati, 2016, p. 143) 
 Increased probability of repression by 57.2% 
(and of combined concessions and repression 
by 2.4%) 
Latin America (Franklin, 
2009, pp. 710) 
 Increased probability of repression by nearly 
100% for the highest levels of violence 
Latin America (Franklin, 
2008, p. 205) 
Non-violent protest 
tactics (e.g. strikes, 
occupations, 
hunger strikes) 
Nonviolent occupation increases the probability of 
concession by 7.3% 
 
Hunger strikes increase the probability of 
concession by 11.9% 
Decreased likelihood of repression, especially 
for hunger strikes 
Latin America (Franklin, 
2009, p. 709) 
Source: Author’s own, data taken from: 
Carothers & Youngs, 2015: worldwide scope, focusing primarily on the period 2010-2015 
DeMeritt et al., 2016: worldwide scope, considering only human rights violations identified by UNHCR from 1995 to 2010   
Brancati, 2016: worldwide scope, considering only protests seeking democratic reforms, from 1989 to 2011 
Franklin, 2009: Latin American protests, covering 827 or 832 challenges (depending on availability of data) in Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Guatemala, Mexico, Nicaragua, and Venezuela, 1981-1995. 
Franklin, 2008: Latin American protests, covering 873 challenges in Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Guatemala, Mexico, Nicaragua, and Venezuela, 1981-1995. 
Hafner-Burton, 2005: Global datasets on government repression or political terror, 1972-2002
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The size of protests is particularly significant. In general, the larger a protest movement is, the 
more likely it is to obtain concessions from the government, although there is considerable 
variation in governments’ responses (Carothers & Youngs, 2015, p. 5). A global study of 310 
democracy protests across 92 countries from 1989-2011 found that the size of protests – both in 
terms of the absolute number of protesters and the proportion of the population participating in 
the protests – was the most significant factor in predicting whether governments were likely to 
make significant political concessions (Brancati, 2016, pp. 128–132). 
A similar statistical study of protests in Latin America also found that larger protests tend to be 
more successful in extracting concessions, but the effect was much less pronounced: protests 
with more than 100,000 participants were only 2.5% more likely to receive concessions than 
protests with fewer than 20 participants, all else being equal (Franklin, 2009, p. 710). However, 
this study showed that larger protests were much less likely to provoke a violent response from 
government: the largest protest events were 37% less likely to be repressed, and 34% percent 
more likely to be tolerated, than the smallest ones (Franklin, 2009, p. 710).  
Countries with a poor record on human rights are, according to a statistical study of protests in 
Latin America, increasingly likely to attempt to repress protests. However, when such countries 
also have high foreign capital dependency, the probability of repression decreases by 29.8% and 
the probability of concessions increases by 60.2%. ‘Challenges that occur in countries that 
receive much foreign aid or investment and that have recently been criticized for human rights 
violations tend to be safer and much more effective’ (Franklin, 2009, p. 711). Signing up to 
international human rights agreements does not appear to have a mitigating effect, likely due to 
the lack of enforcement mechanisms within most such treaties (Franklin, 2008, p. 189). However, 
preferential trade agreements containing ‘hard’ (specific, legally binding, and enforceable) 
standards for human rights do tend to improve countries’ human rights practices, although the 
effect is fairly small: the probability of repressing human rights from one year to the next is 
reduced by up to a maximum of 7% for the worst offenders if they are parties to one or more 
such agreements (Hafner-Burton, 2005). 
Violent protests strongly attract violent responses, increasing the probability of violent 
repression in Latin America by 57% in one study and by nearly 100% for the highest levels of 
violence in another (Franklin, 2008, p. 205, 2009, p. 710). Non-violent protest tactics increase 
the likelihood of concessions and discourage repression. A statistical analysis of protests in Latin 
America finds that nonviolent occupations increase the probability of concessions by 7.3% and 
hunger strikes increase the probability of concessions by 11.9% (Franklin, 2009, p. 709). 
4. International actors’ responses to protests 
International actors appear to rarely respond actively and directly to protests in other countries.3 
International actors sometimes make statements indicating support for the principle that 
populations should have the right to determine their futures (for example in Ukraine in 2013), or 
comment on the issues driving protests (for example, international actors urged the Romanian 
government to rethink and reverse its weakening of the justice system in 2017 and 2018) but it is 
not clear how much influence such statements have. It is rare for international actors to take 
                                                   
3 Authoritarian leaders often blame protests on foreign influence (Carothers & Youngs, 2015, p. 21), but this 
report focuses on governments’ and international actors’ responses to protests, rather than on how protest 
movements arise and develop. 
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stronger actions such as imposing sanctions on countries based on a government’s response to 
protests (Brancati, 2016, p. 125).  
International actors do often respond to protests when a government represses protests violently 
by issuing statements condemning excessive use of force, but there does not appear to be 
strong evidence that such statements have much direct influence. Indeed, one study of human 
rights violations worldwide from 1995-2010 finds the reverse: when states are ‘named and 
shamed’ for repressive tactics, they ‘continue using the shamed tactic and simultaneously 
increase other rights violations that help hide it’ (DeMeritt et al., 2016, p. 1). This study found that 
‘when a country is shamed for torture by the United Nations in a given year, the level of 
disappearances increases in the following year’ (DeMeritt et al., 2016, p. 21). Another study, 
focusing on protests in Latin America between 1981 and 1995, similarly found that ‘all sources of 
human rights criticism are positively and statistically significantly related to the subsequent 
repression against contentious political challenges’ (Franklin, 2008, p. 201). The author suggests 
that this does not mean that criticism encourages future abuses, but that criticism targets long-
term abusers who are unlikely to change their practices regardless of what critics say. 
The existence of economic ties between countries appears to have a moderating effect on a 
government’s response to protests. The study of human rights violations in Latin America 
mentioned above finds that where there are strong economic ties to other countries, criticism 
incentivises governments to reduce repression of subsequent protests, but that this effect lasts 
no more than six months. This is most effective when the criticism comes from NGOs, religious 
groups, and foreign governments, where the probability of repression is reduced by 31% to 33%; 
intergovernmental organisations such as the UN have relatively little influence and reduce the 
probability of future repression by only 10%.(Franklin, 2008, pp. 187–204). Another study of 
protest movements in Latin America found that high foreign capital dependency increases the 
probability that a government will make concessions to protesters by 60.2%, and decreases the 
probability of repression of protests by 29.8% in countries with poor human rights records 
(Franklin, 2009, p. 711). Countries that are party to preferential trade agreements that contain 
‘hard’ (specific, legally binding, enforceable) standards for human rights protection are up to 7% 
less likely to use repression from year to year for the worst offenders (Hafner-Burton, 2005). 
Finally, Brancati  (2016, p. 181) argues that a strong economy enhances the likelihood of 
democracy protests achieving successful outcomes (although protests are less likely to occur 
when economic conditions are good). 
Strong international involvement on the issues driving protest may be able to support 
protesters in achieving positive outcomes. In Guatemala in 2015, for example, an internationally-
supported commission exposed a high-level corruption scandal, triggering mass protests and 
enabling a dual-pronged attack on corruption which led to the removal of the president and vice-
president from office. However, a subsequent Guatemalan government undermined international 
support for the commission by lobbying the USA, and the commission has since been disbanded 
(see case study below). 
In unusual cases, international actors have responded to protests by taking advantage of the 
disorder caused by protest movements to advance their own purposes, an extreme example 
being Russia’s annexation of Crimea during the Ukrainian Euromaidan protests of 2014. 
5. Outcomes of protests 
Most protests do not achieve their desired outcomes. ‘Many non-democratic governments hit 
by protests are proving able to survive them’ (Carothers & Youngs, 2015, p. 20). Many ‘semi-
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authoritarian’ governments ‘allow a limited amount of opposition political activity and independent 
civil society, both to release some political pressure in the system and to keep a degree of 
international legitimacy’, but will react to restrict political space or undermine the opposition’s 
legitimacy when protests emerge (Carothers & Youngs, 2015, p. 17). A review of 843 protests in 
84 countries between 2006 and 2013 (including protests aimed at corporations and employers as 
well as governments, so this includes a greater diversity of events than those discussed 
elsewhere in this report) found that 63% of the protests ‘achieved neither their intended demands 
(when demands are stated) nor results toward alleviating the expressed grievances’ (Ortiz et al., 
2013, p. 36). 
However, many protests do manage to achieve at least some of their goals. As Carothers & 
Youngs write (2015, p. 23): 
Political outcomes of major protests in recent years run a full gamut of results: no 
perceptible impact; no change in the formal political system but long-term shifts in public 
mentality that may presage future political changes; the ousting of a regime and at least 
an attempted process of democratic change; something akin to a democratic revolution; 
an antidemocratic coup; prolonged civil war; and generalized political chaos. While some 
protest movements have indeed foundered at the task of translating protest energy into 
sustained political engagement, others have made progress in this regard.  
The case studies summarised later in this report illustrate several examples of successful 
outcomes achieved by protest movements, including: 
 reforms to education and social policy in Chile, including eliminating profit at all levels of 
the education system, returning control of education to the national government, 
increasing funding for social programmes including expansion of free higher education, 
and creating new public universities and colleges; 
 constitutional reform, strengthening civil society, reforms to the police, breaking up 
monopolies, deregulating the economy, and reforming state-owned enterprises in 
Ukraine;  
 reversing government initiatives and repealing legislation, blocking the development of a 
mining project, and exposing corruption in Romania; and  
 removing high officials from office in Guatemala, Ukraine, and Romania. 
The protests most likely to achieve results are those related to political, legal, or social 
rights. A review of 843 protests in 84 countries between 2006 and 2013 found that in the cases 
where governments responded to grievances, almost half were related to political, legal and 
social rights. These responses included a change of government, adoption of a new constitution, 
changes to law or policy, resignation of high officials, new elections, creation of a new political 
party or movement, legal recognition of political or social rights, or exposure of government or 
corporate secrets (Ortiz et al., 2013, p. 37). Economic achievements made up less than a third of 
achievements, and most of these were about labour issues such as pay and working conditions, 
and only to a lesser degree about broader economic issues such as subsidies, taxes, pension 
reform, labour market reform, social investment, and changes to controversial economic 
measures. Less than 10% of achievements were related to urban development and infrastructure 
projects, and another 10% were less tangible outcomes such as raising the prominence of issues 
in public discourse or opening a dialogue or negotiation (Ortiz et al., 2013, p. 37).  
A review of democracy protests worldwide notes that one third of all democracy protests between 
1989 and 2011 led to either full democratic transitions or smaller-scale democratic reforms within 
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one year (Brancati, 2016, p. 158). The most common types of reforms that governments made in 
response to these protests were (in descending order of frequency): increasing the openness 
and competitiveness of national elections; rectifying electoral malfeasance; restoring elections 
where they had been suspended due to a war or coup; holding elections for new or previously 
unelected offices; or upholding the results of elections that had already occurred (Brancati, 2016, 
pp. 109–115).  
It is rare for governments or high officials to be removed from power as a direct response 
to protests. Such drastic outcomes may require violent action: a study of democracy protests 
suggests that ‘chief executives are more much likely to be removed from power when protesters 
act violently than when they do not’ (Brancati, 2016, p. 143). In Ukraine, for example, violent 
protests in 2013-2014 led to the fall of the president after a backlash against excessive use of 
force by the government. In Guatemala, peaceful protests were able to remove the president and 
vice-president, but the protesters in this case had the benefit of sharing an agenda with a high-
profile anti-corruption panel with strong public support in the country and international support 
from the UN and thirteen donor countries (see case study below). In Romania, recent (2012-
2017) protests led to the fall of two governments with very little violence (see case study below). 
It is difficult for protests to sustain sufficient momentum to achieve deep institutional 
reform. Some observers argue that protest movements can ‘tear down old structures but not 
foster sustained political institution building or effective participation in formal political processes’ 
(Carothers & Youngs, 2015, p. 18). In Ukraine in 2004, for example, demonstrators forced an 
election to be held democratically but struggled to achieve deeper institutional reform (Carothers 
& Youngs, 2015, p. 19). A decade later, further protests led to the fall of another government but 
despite new people being brought to power, political institutions remain closed, power remains 
centralised, the electoral system has not been reformed, and wealthy and powerful interests 
remain entrenched and resistant to change (see case study below). A similar inability to follow 
through with reforms can be seen in Guatemala, where a corruption scandal led to high officials 
being forced out of office in 2015, but entrenched interests were able to push back and close 
down the anti-corruption commission a few years later (see case study below).  In Romania, 
mass protests from 2012 through 2018 led to the repeal of legislation, the resignation of high 
officials, and the fall of two governments, but despite these gains the establishment’s control of 
political institutions remains unbroken and attacks on anticorruption efforts have slowed at best 
(see case study below).  
Some protest movements have attempted to sustain momentum for reform by entering 
politics by joining existing political parties or forming new ones, or by connecting with existing 
institutions like labour movements which have had an ongoing role in political life during and after 
the protests (Carothers & Youngs, 2015, p. 19). Some protest movements ‘have had impacts on 
socioeconomic policies, aiming at the level of specific policy reform rather than systemic change’ 
(Carothers & Youngs, 2015, p. 20).  
6. Case studies 
Chile, 2011-2013 
In 2011, university and secondary school students in Chile embarked on a protest campaign 
nominally aimed at reforms to the education system, but also challenging fundamental elements 
of the neoliberal socio-economic model enshrined in the constitution (Larrabure & Torchia, 2015; 
Pousadela, 2013). Since the Pinochet dictatorship (1973-1990), basic education had been the 
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responsibility of local governments and the higher education system had essentially been 
privatised. This led to large inequalities in education provision across regions and socio-
economic groups, large variability in quality of education, high tuition costs, and high levels of 
student debt (Larrabure & Torchia, 2015, p. 253; Pousadela, 2013). The protesters sought to 
change the role of government in education from being a regulator of private markets to being a 
guarantor and provider of education, demanded significant tax reforms, sought to increase 
equality of opportunity, and sought to increase the accountability of politicians (Pousadela, 2013). 
Although unrest can be traced back to 2006, the protests began in earnest in April 2011 with a 
student strike at the Central University of Chile, protesting against a plan to sell the university to 
a for-profit company. The students initially demanded enforcement of a ban on profit in higher 
education and strengthening of government regulation of private universities, although later 
demands included tax reform, measures to increase government accountability and 
renationalising the copper industry to pay for free education. Between April and October, protests 
spread nationwide with support from social organisations and labour unions, and the movement 
gained strong support from the population at large. Many protest events occurred across the 
country, growing in size from tens of thousands of participants initially to hundreds of thousands 
and one event of nearly a million participants in August. Protesters occupied university and 
secondary school buildings, organised labour strikes that spread nationally, marched in the 
streets, organised people to bang pots and pans from balconies and windows when street 
protests were banned, organised hunger strikes, and used creative events including music, 
dance, flash mobs, and a mass kissing marathon (Larrabure & Torchia, 2015, p. 259; Pousadela, 
2013). Many protests were peaceful, but there was also a contingent of masked violent 
protesters, and vandalism and violence took place at protests and increased over time. 
(Pousadela, 2013). The movement had positive international media coverage, and one of the 
leaders of the movement, Camila Vallejo, was named ‘person of the year’ by The Guardian 
newspaper (Larrabure & Torchia, 2015, p. 256). 
The government of president Sebastián Piñera engaged in discussions with protesters, but 
negotiations were strained and proposals from each side were rejected by the other as being 
vague, ineffective, not in good faith, or not responding to demands. The government offered to 
establish special negotiation forums but this was rejected by protesters as an attempt to move 
negotiations out of public view and not offering equality in the negotiation process. Police 
responded harshly to violence at protests, and there was some evidence of police agents 
provocateurs instigating violence in some instances. More than a thousand protesters were 
arrested and one was killed. In October, the government introduced a bill to impose jail 
sentences on those responsible for school occupations, stepped up arrests of protesters, and 
disrupted a major march with barricades, water cannon, and tear gas. (Pousadela, 2013) 
Public opinion was generally supportive of the protesters, with opinion polls showing 89% 
support for their demands at the height of the movement, while the government’s rate of support 
dropped to as low as 22%. However, most universities returned to teaching by November 2011, 
and secondary schools resumed normal operation by January 2012, although protest activities 
continued with less intensity (Pousadela, 2013).  
The student movement did, however, weaken the government, put education and social 
inequality on the political agenda, and generate a broad public consensus for reform (Guzmán-
Concha, 2017, p. 40; Larrabure & Torchia, 2015, p. 262). In the 2013 national elections, 
candidates on both the left and the right promised substantial education reforms. The former 
government was defeated and the new president, Michelle Bachelet, won on a platform which 
included education reform, constitutional change, tax reform, and social inequality (Guzmán-
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Concha, 2017, p. 1; Larrabure & Torchia, 2015, p. 262). In addition, some members of the 
student protest movement, including the most prominent leader of the movement, Camila Vallejo, 
were elected to Congress (Larrabure & Torchia, 2015, p. 262). The government’s policy 
commitments responded to some of the student protesters’ demands, including eliminating profit 
at all levels of the education system, returning control of education to the national government, 
increasing funding for social programmes including expansion of free higher education, and 
creating new public universities and colleges (Guzmán-Concha, 2017, pp. 37–40; Larrabure & 
Torchia, 2015, pp. 264–265). Some of the protesters’ more radical demands on constitutional 
reform and nationalising the copper industry to pay for free education were not adopted 
(Larrabure & Torchia, 2015, pp. 264–265). However, opposition from private schools and 
universities, some parents’ associations, and right-wing political groups blocked implementation 
of some reforms (Guzmán-Concha, 2017, p. 41) and in 2018, Bachelet lost the presidential 
election to Sebastián Piñera, who was the former president during the height of the student 
protest movement.  As of late 2019, Piñera’s government was once again battling large-scale 
violent street protests, this time sparked by rising living costs and high inequality (BBC, 2019). 
Ukraine, 2013-2014  
The Euromaidan (‘European Square’) protest movement in Ukraine was triggered in November 
2013 when President Viktor Yanukovych suddenly suspended plans to sign an Association 
Agreement with the European Union (Shveda & Park, 2016, p. 85; Zelinska, 2017, p. 1). The 
protests were a sudden and unexpected release of long-standing public frustration with the 
government, and although harshly repressed, they led to the downfall of the government after 
three months of violence (Zelinska, 2017, p. 1).  
The grievances behind the protests ‘were deeply embedded within the Ukrainian political system 
and economy’ (Zelinska, 2017, p. 5). At the time of the protest, Ukraine ranked lowest in Europe 
in terms of the population’s confidence in their government, and ‘was at all-time low since the 
establishment of independent Ukraine’ (Shveda & Park, 2016, p. 85). Governmental efficiency 
ranked low by international standards and corruption was rampant. Although the country had 
gained its independence in 1991, it had not successfully reformed all elements of the old Soviet-
style management and leadership, and remained ‘an inefficient hybrid’ of old and new (Shveda & 
Park, 2016, p. 86). Power was highly concentrated in the hands of President Yanukovich and his 
inner circle, and the political system offered insufficient space for civil society or political 
participation other than through elections. (Zelinska, 2017, p. 6). Protests on tax policy and 
education policy had already taken place (Shveda & Park, 2016, p. 86) and activists also 
complained of unemployment, high taxes, social injustice, and income inequality (Zelinska, 2017, 
p. 6). Many Ukrainians hoped that the process of European integration would lead to reforming 
and modernising economic and political institutions (Shveda & Park, 2016, p. 86).  
The protests were ignited in reaction to the suspension of the Association Agreement process on 
21 November 2013, when Mustafa Nayem, a journalist and activist, posted a message on 
Facebook urging people to protest in Maidan Nezalezhnosti (Independence Square) in central 
Kyiv (Metzger & Tucker, 2017). Protesters set up a tent camp to occupy the square, and 
occupied similar central squares in other cities (Shveda & Park, 2016, p. 87). The authorities 
attempted to remove the tent camp the next day, but were not successful (Shveda & Park, 2016, 
p. 87). Students were the initial driving force of the movement, but were joined within a few days 
by more than a hundred thousand people from diverse backgrounds, most unaffiliated with 
political parties or civic organisatoins (Shapovalova, 2019, p. 25; Shveda & Park, 2016, p. 87). 
Protest tactics initially included tent camps, blocking squares and streets, holding marches and 
rallies, holding popular assemblies, lying down in front of the prosecutor general's office, silent 
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protests, and consumer boycotts of companies owned by members of the governing political 
party (Zelinska, 2017, p. 4). The protesters made extensive demands including the resignation of 
the cabinet, the adoption of laws necessary for European integration, and the signing of the 
Association Agreement, but these were rejected.  
The number of protesters dwindled to less than 500, and on 31 November the authorities used 
force to disperse the protesters in Independence Square. However, the use of force was widely 
perceived to be excessive and ‘the abuses of the police forces… provoked the transformation of 
the student movement into the nationwide movement against the regime’ as well as attracting 
criticism from the EU, NATO, UN, and international NGOs (Shveda & Park, 2016, p. 87). Half a 
million protesters took to the streets, occupied government offices in Kyiv and other cities, and 
established fortified barricades on Independence Square, demanding the resignation of the 
president and his government (Shveda & Park, 2016, pp. 87–88). The government passed 
legislation banning demonstrations, but protests increased in intensity and violence became 
more common. Protesters used catapults and threw bricks, fireworks, and Molotov cocktails at 
police, burned buses and tires, and occupied government buildings (Zelinska, 2017, p. 5). 
Several protesters were killed in violent clashes (Shveda & Park, 2016, p. 88). International 
organisations and foreign governments made statements in support of Ukrainians’ rights to 
freedom of speech and assembly, and criticised the government and police for excessive use of 
force (see for example European Commission, 2013; United Nations Ukraine, 2013) 
In January and February 2014, talks were held, brokered by politicians from Poland, France, 
Germany, and Russia, but the government and the protesters could not agree on timing for new 
elections (Shveda & Park, 2016, p. 88). The bloodiest clashes of the protests took place in 
February, with 113 protesters being killed (Shveda & Park, 2016, p. 88). On 21 February, 
protesters stormed the Presidential Palace and President Yanukovich fled the city. He was 
officially removed from office by Parliament the following day (Shveda & Park, 2016, p. 88).  
It must also be noted that the Euromaidan protests did not achieve the same degree of popular 
support in areas of eastern Ukraine which were more Russian-leaning than Europe-leaning, and 
in some areas ‘antimaidan’ counterprotests were held, although observers question whether they 
were true grassroots movements (Zelinska, 2017, p. 5). Russia took advantage of the opportunity 
offered by the fall of Yanukovych to annex Crimea, leading to an ongoing crisis in the region. 
New presidential elections were held in May 2014, followed by parliamentary elections in October 
(Shveda & Park, 2016, p. 90). The country restored the 2004 constitution, which limited 
presidential powers, provincial administrators were removed from office, the Association 
Agreement with the EU was signed, which obliged the country to go through further reforms, and 
civil society has strengthened (Zelinska, 2017, p. 6). Political accountability and transparency 
have increased, public access to information has increased, corruption has decreased (although 
it is still extensive), and reforms have taken place in the police, although not the judiciary. Steps 
have been taken towards breaking up monopolies, deregulating the economy, and reforming 
state-owned enterprises (Shapovalova, 2019, p. 26; Solonenko, 2016, pp. 4–5). Some 
observers, however, argue that reforms have not yet been deep enough, and that despite new 
people being brought to power, political institutions remain closed, power remains centralised, 
the electoral system has not been reformed, and wealthy and powerful interests remain 
entrenched and resistant to change (Shapovalova, 2019, p. 26; Solonenko, 2016, p. 6; Zelinska, 
2017, p. 7). ‘The old system and its structures are fighting for their survival, as new actors – from 
both within the system and outside it – push for a new social contract’ (Solonenko, 2016, pp. 1, 
9). The process of reform initiated by the Euromaidan protests is still ongoing. 
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Guatemala, 2015 
Following the signing of peace accords in Guatemala in 1996 that marked the end of 36 years of 
intensely violent civil war, many former military and paramilitary groups transformed into criminal 
networks that operated with impunity due to continuing links with the state. After lobbying by civil 
society organisations and international partners, and after an international incident in which 
Guatemalan police officers were involved in the murder of Salvadoran members of the Central 
American Parliament, the Guatemalan government invited the UN to establish an international 
panel, the International Commission Against Impunity in Guatemala (Comisión Internacional 
contra la Impunidad en Guatemala, CICIG), funded by international donors, to investigate 
organised crime and strengthen the prosecution service and the police. The CICIG was 
successful and popular, and has been credited with reducing the country’s homicide rate by 5% 
per year since it was formed and increasing the proportion of homicides solved by a factor of four 
(International Crisis Group, 2018, pp. 5–13).  
Beginning in 2013 and 2014, the CICIG increased its attention to corruption networks within 
government, including investigations of administrative corruption, illegal election financing, and 
bribery (Flores, 2019, p. 41; International Crisis Group, 2018, p. 7). In 2015, the Attorney General 
and the CICIG exposed a network of corrupt customs officials taking bribes in exchange for 
reducing import tariffs that involved 64 people including President Otto Pérez Molina, Vice-
President Roxana Baldetti, and other high officials (Mitchell & Cameron, 2015, p. 1).  
Reacting to this announcement, Gabriel Wer, ‘a 33-year-old business administrator with no 
history of social activism’ (Rogers, 2015) posted a message on Facebook inviting people to 
protest in Central Plaza, and more than 35,000 people turned up to demand the resignation of 
the vice-president (and later the president) under the slogan ‘#RenunciaYa’ (Resign Now) 
(Flores, 2019, pp. 42–43). The protests were short, non-violent, and persistent, continuing over 
twenty Saturday afternoons in plazas across the country. They were primarily youth-led, urban, 
and middle-class, but over time also began to attract support from indigenous groups and 
peasants’ groups (Flores, 2019, pp. 43–44). 
After ten such protests, the vice-president resigned, but the president remained in power. 
Protesters called for a national strike on 27 August to increase pressure. More than 250,000 
people gathered in Guatemala City’s Central Plaza, with tens of thousands in plazas across the 
country. (Flores, 2019, pp. 44–45)  A few days later, Parliament voted to remove the president’s 
immunity. He resigned and was arrested. ‘His resignation was widely celebrated and the 
Saturday mobilisations came to an immediate halt’ (Flores, 2019, p. 45). 
Following the resignations, some protesters continued to campaign against corruption and for 
greater government accountability, but for the most part the protests have not produced a 
coherent movement for long-term reform (Flores, 2019, pp. 45–46). Indeed, powerful elites 
remained entrenched and began to push back. ‘The anti-corruption crusade led by the public 
prosecutor together with CICIG had almost complete support from Guatemalan society during 
2015 and 2016’ (Flores, 2019, p. 46), but CICIG met increasing resistance as later indictments 
included not only corrupt politicians but also bankers, corporations, and family members of the 
powerful traditional economic elite (Flores, 2019, p. 46). 
Following President Molina’s resignation and arrest, Jimmy Morales, a political novice and 
television personality, was elected ‘on a wave of public outrage at the political establishment’ 
(Breda, 2019, p. 1).  Morales became an opponent of CICIG, and lobbied the United States, the 
principal funder of CICIG, to undermine international support for it.  He and some of his family 
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members were investigated in 2017 by CICIG for fraud, embezzlement and campaign finance 
violations. Later that year, he announced that the commission’s mandate to operate would not be 
renewed, and the commission was closed in September 2019. (Breda, 2019, pp. 2–3) The 
current President, Alejandro Giammattei, has proposed replacing CICIG with a new national 
body, but doubts have been raised about its effectiveness and independence (Breda, 2019, p. 2). 
Romania, 2012-2018 
Since 2012, Romania has experienced a series of large and mostly peaceful protest events 
focusing primarily on government corruption. The country has long-standing problems with 
corruption, currently ranking second-worst in Europe (Transparency International, 2020, p. 22). 
Some of the protest events of 2012-2018 have been successful in achieving aims including the 
repeal of proposed legislation, the resignation of high officials, and the fall of two governments. 
Despite these gains, however, the protests have not been successful in achieving long-term 
structural change. Some of the most significant events in this period are briefly summarised 
below. 
In 2012, protests against plans to privatise an emergency medical service known as SMURD 
were sparked when the president dismissed the state secretary for health and founder of the 
service, an act which was viewed as unjust and discretionary (Buzasu, 2019, p. 31). Violent 
street protests ensued and led directly to the resignation of prime minister Emil Boc (Buzasu, 
2019, p. 31).  
In 2013, protests lasting a month were triggered by the government’s approval of a draft law to 
enable the construction of a gold mine in the town of Roșia Montană. Opponents raised 
environmental concerns and alleged corruption of public officials, and held weekly protests, 
although opinions were divided and there were also counter-protests by miners and other 
supporters of the project citing its economic benefits (Buzasu, 2019, pp. 31–32; Marinas, 2013; 
Pojoranu, 2017, p. 43). Parliament rejected the bill and ancient Roman ruins in the area are now 
protected as a national historic site (Pojoranu, 2017, p. 43).  
In 2015, a fire at the Bucharest nightclub Colectiv killed 65 people and exposed corruption of 
public officials who had failed to undertake safety checks (Buzasu, 2019, p. 32). Prime Minister 
Victor Ponta, who had been clinging to power despite challenges over the previous two years, 
resigned after a protest which attracted 25,000 participants (Buzasu, 2019, p. 32; Pojoranu, 
2017, p. 45). 
In 2017, the government passed an ordinance decriminalising government corruption and abuse 
of office below a certain threshold (Buzasu, 2019, p. 32). A crowd of 10,000 gathered 
spontaneously to protest, and the protests quickly grew and spread nationwide (Pojoranu, 2017, 
pp. 45–46). There was also international criticism of the Romanian government’s actions: 
Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, the Netherlands, and the United States issued a joint 
statement urging the government to ‘reverse this unhelpful course’ (United States Embassy in 
Romania, 2017). Daily demonstrations peaked on 5 February when almost 600,000 people 
participated in protests across the country. The government repealed the ordinance a few days 
later (Buzasu, 2019, p. 32). 
In 2018, nearly 100,000 people gathered in January to protest against government measures 
that would weaken the judiciary and help corrupt politicians avoid conviction (Buzasu, 2019, pp. 
34–35; Stan & Zaharia, 2019, p. 233). The EU issued a statement urging the Romanian 
government to rethink the proposals (Deletant, 2018; European Commission, 2018). Smaller 
demonstrations continued almost daily, all of which were peaceful, until another large-scale event 
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was organized in August which again drew nearly 100,000 people protesting against the justice 
bills and the dismissal of the head of the national anticorruption agency. The police responded 
more aggressively this time, beating protesters and using tear gas and water cannon, with 
between 247 and 452 people injured (reports vary) (Buzasu, 2019, pp. 34–35; Deletant, 2018, p. 
2; Ilie & Dragin, 2019; Stan & Zaharia, 2019, p. 239).  
Many of the protest events of 2012-2018 were successful in achieving their immediate aims, 
including the repeal of proposed legislation, the resignation of high officials, and the fall of two 
governments. Despite these gains, however, the protests have not been successful in achieving 
long-term structural change, and some argue that the events of this period illustrate ‘a kind of 
trench war… between the government and the protesters over several years and that the 
protests to date have ‘only delayed the governing coalition’s stronghold on public institutions and 
its attacks on anticorruption legislation’ (Buzasu, 2019, p. 35). Some activists continue to 
challenge the government through civic networks and online campaigns which have had some 
successes, such as the Corruption Kills (Coruptia Ucide) network, formed after the Colectiv 
nightclub fire, which has helped uncover cases of corruption, fraud, and embezzlement. Others 
have begun to become involved in politics by setting up new political parties, such as the center-
right USR and PLUS and the left-wing Democracy and Solidarity Party (Buzasu, 2019, pp. 34–
38). However, thus far these efforts have not yet led to deep institutional reform, and in August 
2019, 20,000 people held yet another protest against entrenched corruption, weak public 
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